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IDENTIFYING CARTEL POLICING UNDER




THis article makes inferences about oligopoly behavior from observing
an industry's response to unexpected changes in the market price. In
particular, the econometric methodology identifies firms that act more
competitively following unexpected declines in demand. This behavior is
interpreted as reflecting cartel policing in a market in which cooperating
firms cannot distinguish between rival cheating and negative-demand
shocks.
The econometric methodology is applied to study the U.S. steel in-
dustry during the Great Depression. Cartel policing is detected for the
period between mid-1935 and mid-1939. In contrast, oligopoly behavior
did not vary with unexpected price declines between mid-1933 and
mid-1935, when the industry operated under a National Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA) Code of Fair Competition. Because collusion was le-
gally enforceable under the code, market punishments were unneces-
sary.
The empirical analysis is based upon a structural model of industry
behavior within which the determinants of the oligopoly supply function
can be specified. The model emphasizes that when firms cannot perfectly
monitor their competitors, oligopoly behavior and industry supply will be
influenced by the inferences about rival behavior that firms make when
they observe unexpected fluctuations in the market price.
* The Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
New Hampshire. The author is indebted to colleagues too numerous to name and to an
anonymous referee for helpful discussions, to Chris Davies for research assistance, and to
the Federal Trade Commission for sponsoring the conference on empirical methods of as-
sessing market power.
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I. IDENTIFYING THE DETERMINANTS OF OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR
A. Supply and Demand for a Homogeneous Product Oligopoly
An (inverse) market demand curve for a homogeneous product industry
is defined in equation (1). Here, P is the market price and Q represents
industry output. The vector Y includes those exogenous variables shifting
demand that are observable contemporaneously by the firms in the indus-
try. The shock E represents random fluctuations in demand.
P = f(Q, Y)+E. (1)
This demand curve defines a marginal-revenue function (2). In equation
(2), the notation fq( ) represents the output derivative of the demand
function.
MR = f(Q, Y) + Qfq(Q, Y) + E. (2)
An aggregate-industry supply relation, equation (3), is well defined for a
homogeneous-product industry even when firms do not behave competi-
tively. The supply relation generates the model's equilibrium in conjunc-
tion with market demand.
P = O(P - MR) + c(Q, W) + v. (3)
The supply relation sums three terms: the short-run marginal cost func-
tion c(Q, W), a random cost shock v,1 and the O(P - MR) term rep-
resenting oligopoly behavior. The notation W represents a vector of ob-
servable, exogenous variables shifting marginal cost. By rewriting the
O(P - MR) term using equations (1) and (2), the supply relation takes
the form
P = -OQfq(Q, Y) + c(Q, W) + v. (4)
The markup parameter 0 reflects oligopoly behavior.2 For example,
under perfect competition the industry sets price equal to marginal cost,
so 0 equals zero. If the industry instead selects the joint-profit-maximizing
price, then 0 equals one. Other oligopoly models will predict a value for 0
between zero and one. In general, 0 may be a function of the exogenous
variables in the model, including the shocks. This article tests empirically
a theory about the effect of demand shocks E on 0.
Equation (3) aggregates individual-firm cost shocks into the scalar industry cost shock v.
This substitution is defensible when the firm shocks are highly correlated, as would occur if
they largely reflect common input price variation.
2 Timothy Bresnahan, The Oligopoly Solution Concept Is Identified, 10 Econ. Letters 87
(1982).
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B. Cartels That Shoot First and Ask Questions Later
Fluctuations in oligopoly behavior are often explained by changes in
industry structure. For example, the familiar literatures on "critical con-
centration ratios" and "practices facilitating collusion" describe how a
reduction in the number of sellers or the introduction of practices that
increase firm information about rival behavior can cause an oligopoly to
switch from a noncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative one. Other
structural changes might cause industry behavior to switch from coopera-
tion to competition, as when entry barriers are relaxed.
Some explanations for alteration in oligopoly behavior do not involve
changes in industry structure, but share the view of the structural expla-
nation that either competition or cooperation is a dominant strategy for all
sellers. For example, large shifts in demand or the introduction of innova-
tive production technologies might cause a cartel to break down by in-
creasing firm incentives to cheat.
In these static models, firms follow pure strategies in equilibrium.3 As a
result, these familiar stories have difficulty explaining the behavior of
cartels that appear to form again after price wars. 4 Collusive prices punc-
tuated by competitive episodes have been noted, for example, in the U.S.
automobile industry during the 1950s, 5 in the U.S. railroad industry of the
nineteenth century,6 and in some international cartels during the 1920s
and 1930s.7 To address such situations, Green and Porter developed a
"trigger price" dynamic oligopoly supergame model. 8
The Green and Porter model studies firms in an environment of uncer-
tainty. Sellers are unable to distinguish between declines in demand and
3 See George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 432 (1964); Dale Osborne,
Cartel Problems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 835 (1976); Michael Spence, Efficient Collusion and
Reaction Functions, II Can. J. Econ. 527 (1978): Steven Salop. Practices That (Credibly)
Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Struc-
ture 265 (Joseph Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds. 1986).
' But see Margaret Slade, Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of
Tacit Collusion, 35 J. Indus. Econ. 499 (1987).
' Timothy Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry:
The 1955 Price War, 35 J. Indus. Econ. 457 (1987).
6 Robert Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars. 33 J. Indus. Econ. 415
(1985); Robert Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-
1886, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301 (1983).
7 Valerie Suslow, Stability in International Cartels: An Empirical Survey 13 (Working
Paper E-88-7, Hoover Institution 1988).
' Edward Green & Robert Porter, Non-cooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price In-
formation, 52 Econometrica 87 (1984). For a generalization of the Green and Porter model,
see Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, & Ennio Stacchetti, Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imper-
fect Monitoring, 39 J. Econ. Theory 151 (1986).
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rival cheating when they attempt to understand observed price declines.
Green and Porter demonstrate that long stretches of collusive pricing can
occur, so long as all firms respond to large unexpected price declines by
competing for a fixed period of time before raising prices back to the
cooperative level. 9 Cheating is discouraged during high price periods be-
cause the gains to cheating are limited by the likelihood that such behav-
ior will trigger a price war. In the model's equilibrium, no firm actually
cheats but price wars occur whenever demand declines unexpectedly and
substantially.
In the Green and Porter model, the dynamic oligopoly equilibrium fluc-
tuates between static cartel behavior and static noncooperative behavior.
The timing of these shifts is uncorrelated with movement in observable
exogenous demand-shift or supply-shift variables. Porter has supported
this theory econometrically by showing that a switching regression
model, in which the markup 0 takes on either a high or low value, explains
the behavior of an express, nineteenth-century railroad industry cartel,
the Joint Executive Committee. "
The trigger-price literature shows how price wars can facilitate substan-
tial periods of cooperative pricing: when firms are unable to distinguish
between demand declines and output expansion by a rival, they may
enforce collusive pricing through temporary episodes of increased compe-
tition. In essence, when monitoring of competitors is not perfect, cartels
may "shoot first and ask questions later." Cooperating firms may respond
to the possibility of rival cheating by acting more competitively, for a
time, before returning to collusive pricing.
This plausible outcome appears likely to generalize beyond the restric-
tions of the current models.' In consequence, the econometric technique
of this article identifies cartel policing under uncertainty by applying a
core insight of the trigger-price literature; the empirical methodology de-
termines whether industry members expand their output in response
9 The dynamic equilibrium of the supergame is a noncooperative one. In many periods,
however, the noncooperating oligopoly is able to achieve the static collusive price. A con-
temporaneous observer might describe industry behavior as collusive, but punctuated by
periods of competition.
1o Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability, supra note 6. Porter supports his results further by
demonstrating that the price-war periods identified endogenously through a maximum-
likelihood technique match the price-war periods reported contemporaneously by the trade
press.
" The existing literature selects among multiple equilibria by assuming, implausibly, that
oligopolists are able to bargain to reach the most profitable dynamic equilibrium. Carl
Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior 57 (Discussion Paper No. 126, Discussion Papers
in Economics, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, March 1987). Moreover, the





FIGURE .- Equilibrium with a kinked oligopoly supply function
to unexpected demand declines. The technique first identifies demand
shocks, then tests whether the oligopoly markup falls when unexpected
demand declines are observed.
C. The Kinked Oligopoly Supply Function
If a cartel responds to negative-demand shocks by acting more competi-
tively for a time, then the supply relation faced by the colluding industry
will exhibit a concave kink when demand shifts unexpectedly.' 2 This
kinked oligopoly supply function is depicted in Figure 1.
The discontinuity arises because the markup parameter 0 in the supply
relation (3) is affected asymmetrically by negative- and positive-demand
shocks. A large unexpected downward shift in industry demand will in-
12 Appendix B derives the comparative statics of the simultaneous eq. system (I) and (4)
in order to demonstrate that demand shocks trace out a function with a concave kink, under
the assumption that the markup falls when demand declines unexpectedly.
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duce firms to act more competitively (lowering 0) by increasing output as
a mechanism of cartel policing. In contrast, positive shocks to demand
will not affect 0.
In this story, an asymmetric response is generated solely by random
shifts in demand. No kink in the supply relation will be observed if de-
mand shifts as a result of observable changes in the exogenous variables.
Moreover, the asymmetry will not arise if the industry acts competitively
or if collusion is enforceable without marketplace punishments.
D. The Log-linear Model
In order to identify the cartel response to unexpected demand shifts, a
structural supply relation is estimated. The estimation model assumes
that market demand has a log-linear functional form, as specified in equa-
tion (5). Further, if marginal cost is log-linear, the supply relation (4) can
be written as equation (6).
In P = to + oxln Q + 21n Y + E, (5)
P = 0(P - MR) + exp[3o + 1 lIn Q + 321n W + v]. (6)
In both equations (5) and (6), the vectors of exogenous demand and cost-
shift variables have been truncated to include only one variable of each
type, with no loss of generality. The two shocks, E and v, are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed and to be uncorrelated with
each other.' 
3
When 0 does not vary with Y, the log-linear functional form for demand
permits the identification of the supply relation through simple exclusion
restrictions. Other functional forms for demand, in contrast, guarantee
that the exogenous demand-shift variables will appear in the supply func-
tion. "
13 If cheating were actually to occur in any period, as might be permitted in some generali-
zation of the existing models of oligopolistic supergames with imperfect monitoring, such
behavior could be interpreted as a negative realization of v indistinguishable econometrically
from an unexpected decline in rival marginal cost. (Cartel policing behavior, in contrast, is
interpreted as altering the markup parameter.) Although this possibility would imply that v
has a negative mean, the parameters of interest would remain identified, because two-stage
least squares estimators of the supply relation would continue to generate consistent esti-
mates of all the parameters except the intercept. Finn Forsund, C. A. Knox Lovell, & Peter
Schmidt, A Survey of Production Functions and of Their Relationship to Efficiency Mea-
surements, 13 J. Econometrics 5 (1980).
4 Like the exponential form, however, the linear functional form also permits identifica-
tion by simple exclusion restrictions. Without such restrictions, identification of the supply
relation will turn on the effect of rotations in demand on the equilibrium implied by a variety
of solution concepts rather than on the simple instrumental variables techniques applied
here. Bresnahan, supra note 2.
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Equation (6) may be simplified by employing an implication of equation
(5),15 yielding equation (7).
lnP = 13o - In(I + oeO) + 31In Q + 321n W + v. (7)
In anticipation of the empirical work, this function is further simplified in
equation (8) through application of the approximation In(I + X) s x.1
6
In P = [3o - a.10 + 3ln Q + 321n W + v. (8)
It is next necessary to specify the determinants of 0, the oligopoly
markup parameter. Equation (9) sets forth a simple assumption consistent
with the idea that cartels might act more competitively when demand
declines unexpectedly.
0 = 0* + -y(E). (9)
Equation (9) decomposes the markup parameter into the sum of the con-
stant 0* and a second term -y that depends upon the demand shocks E
insofar as they lead to price declines. 17 The assumption that 0* is constant
ignores the possibility that the exogenous variables Y and W affect the
markup. 18
With this decomposition, the market-supply equation (8) can be re-
written
In P = (13o - cUtO*) - OflY(E) + P3lIn Q + P321n W + v
(10)
= 80 - otI-Y(E) + P3ln Q + 321n W + v.
In the second step of equation (10), the 50 parameter is used to simplify
the notation for the intercept. 19
To identify cartel policing under uncertainty, this article seeks to deter-
mine whether the supply relation contains a term of the form -y(E) that
produces a concave kink in response to demand shocks. This effort is
15 Equation (5) implies that P - MR = -aIP.
6 This approximation is the most reasonable for x < I. Because 0 is less than one, the
approximation is plausible unless demand is very inelastic (that is, unless ja J is large).
'7 Equation (9) presumes that supply shocks v do not affect -y. This assumption is most
plausible for a sample period like the Great Depression in which demand fluctuations are the
primary source of large price declines. Even if this assumption is incorrect, because supply
shocks are large enough also to affect oligopoly behavior, the econometric procedure em-
ployed in this article will continue to estimate consistently the effect of unexpected demand
declines on the markup. The econometric issues involved are similar to those raised by the
possibility of cheating, discussed in note 13 supra.
1S The exclusion of Y is necessary for the structural supply relation to be identified
econometrically.
19 The substitution bo = 3o - as0* emphasizes the difficulty of discriminating between the
markup and parameters of the marginal cost function. Bresnahan, supra note 2.
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complicated by the fact that the demand shocks E are unobservable. Infor-
mation about those shocks is available, however, from estimating the
demand curve (5). In particular, equation (5) can be estimated consis-
tently by single equation methods so long as W, the excluded exogenous
variable from the perspective of the system of equations (5) and (10), is
employed as an instrument for the endogenous variable Q. The vector of
residuals from that regression, denoted DRES, consistently estimates the
vector of demand shocks E.
The function connecting DRES and -y(E) is discontinuous under the
trigger-price equilibrium story. Demand shocks causing unexpected price
declines will not make a cartel act more competitively unless they lead
cooperating firms to suspect rival cheating. Hence, only the largest nega-
tive values of DRES can be expected to affect oligopoly behavior; firms
are unlikely to suspect cheating when unexpected price declines are small
or when price rises unexpectedly. Further, once an unexpected price
decline is sufficiently large to trigger the suspicion of rival cheating, the
cartel's reversionary response to competitive behavior will not necessar-
ily vary with the degree of that unexpected price reduction.
20
Because demand shocks likely affect oligopoly behavior in this discon-
tinuous way, most of the variation in industry behavior associated with
the suspicion of cheating can be captured by a dummy variable. This
variable, denoted DUM, takes on the value of one when the residual from
estimating the demand curve (5) is a large negative number. The periods
in which DUM is triggered are those in which cartel members facing
uncertainty will have the greatest fear of rival cheating and the greatest
incentive to police by expanding output. In particular, equation (11) is
assumed to hold for some scalar -y* < 0.21
"Y(E) = (-y*)DUM. (I)
21) Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability, supra note 6, at 310, found no relation between the
size of the triggering demand shock and the length of the resulting price war in his railroad
cartel data.
21 The assumptions (i) that y(E) does not vary with the size of E once the dummy variable
is triggered and (ii) that demand and marginal cost have log-linear functional forms imply
that, when DUM = I, the supply function will fall to a level equal to the fraction
exp[ -ty*] of its value when DUM = 0. Hence, the supply relation in the empirical model
shifts rather than rotates when demand declines unexpectedly, unlike the behavior depicted
in Figure I.
This result is a special case of a broader set of kinked oligopoly supply functions. With
other functional forms for demand, eq. (4) implies that a discontinuous reduction in 0
following a negative-demand shock will generate a rotation in the supply function. Alterna-
tively. regardless of the equation for demand, the supply function could rotate if -(E) (and
hence the reduction in 0) is permitted to increase with the absolute value of declines in f.
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The relation expressed in equation (11) allows equation (10) to be re-
written in the form of equation (12), so that all variables are observable
In P = b0 - an('*)DUM + P3ln Q + P321n W + v. (12)
According to equation (12), when a large negative-demand shock arises-
sufficiently large to cause the dummy variable to take on the value of
one-the industry responds with increased competition among cartel
members, thus lowering the industry price.
The final equation of the empirical model defines when negative-
demand shocks are sufficiently large to trigger the dummy variable. Equa-
tion (13) sets forth the rule according to which each estimated error of the
demand curve e (that is, each element of the vector DRES) is associated
with a value of the dummy variable.
DUM = I ife < -Ts
= 0 ife - - Ts. (13)
Variable DUM is set equal to one if the estimated demand shock is a
negative number larger in absolute value than a scalar T times s, the
standard error of estimate of the demand curve. The value of T is selected
by searching for it (along with the parameters of the supply function) in
order to maximize the likelihood of observing the supply relation in the
sample.22
22 Allowing T to enter into the supply relation as an endogenous parameter introduces
a large number of discontinuities into the likelihood function for eq. (12). In particular, a
discontinuity arises whenever Tchanges to sweep in or out a demand shock, thereby altering
the variable DUM. Moreover, when the likelihood function shifts discontinuously, the max-
imum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of eq. (12) can change discontinuously. As a
result, iterative numerical optimization methods based on the gradient of the likelihood
function cannot be employed to search for the parameters that maximize the likelihood
function unless the search is conditioned on some value of T.
It may appear at first glance that the likelihood function is not comparable across equa-
tions because the definition of one independent variable, DUM, changes. To see why the
procedure is, in fact, unobjectionable, consider the dummy variable DUM* that would be
created were T = 0; this dummy variable is triggered by a negative-demand shock of any
magnitude. Next, imagine replacing this dummy variable with a set of dummy variables, by
including in the supply function a separate dummy (denoted DUMi) for each negative de-
mand shock. Each DUMi has only one element with a value of one; this variable identifies
the date of the ith negative-demand shock. With this substitution, the vector DUM* is
replaced with approximately n/2 vectors DUM, (for a sample of n observations).
From this perspective, eq. (13) requires that the coefficient associated with each DUM, in
the supply function take on either of two values: the coefficient must be zero, or else it must
be identical to the coefficient on every other DUMj that also has a nonzero coefficient. In
addition, eq. (13) requires that no dummy variable DUM, have a zero coefficient unless all
other DUMj associated with negative-demand shocks smaller in absolute value than the
shock associated with DUM, also have coefficients of zero. The maximum-likelihood proce-
dure appropriately searches over all permissible values of this constrained coefficient space.
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Conditional on estimating the demand function and selecting some
value for T, equation (12) can be estimated consistently with single equa-
tion methods. Because (12) is one of two equations in a system of demand
and supply functions,23 consistent parameter estimates are derived by
employing Y, an excluded exogenous variable, as an instrument for the
endogenous output variable.
When estimates of the supply relation are obtained, the hypothesis of
cartel policing under uncertainty, which is equivalent to the hypothesis
that -y* < 0, is examined through a one-tailed test of the null hypothesis
that -y* = 0. Because a, (the elasticity of inverse demand) is known to be
nonzero, the hypothesis of interest can be tested by examining whether
the coefficient on DUM is negative.
2 4
If the null hypothesis that -y* = 0 is accepted, that result provides no
basis for discriminating between competitive and collusive explanations
for industry behavior. Were the industry behaving competitively, cartel
policing under uncertainty would not be detected. Yet -y* = 0 will also be
observed if cooperation is a dominant strategy for all sellers. In the latter
case, all firms recognize that rival cheating is never a rational strategy,
cartel policing is never necessary, and the markup does not vary with
unexpected reductions in price.
II. THE STEEL INDUSTRY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
The model described above is applied to study oligopoly behavior in the
U.S. steel industry during the Great Depression. This industry was se-
lected for four reasons. First, business-cycle fluctuations promised sub-
stantial demand-side variation, both predictable and random.2 1 Such
23 The simultaneous eq. system (5) and (12) estimated in this article is formally equivalent
to the system (1) and (2) estimated in Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability, supra note 6. Porter
treats the periods of unexpected demand decline as known (from reading the trade press) or
else identifies them as those periods that maximize the likelihood that a switching regression
framework describes the data. In this article, in contrast, such periods are inferred from the
residuals of the demand curve through the construction of DUM.
24 As the demand elasticity st, is negative in eq. (5), the expression -,(-y*) will be
negative if y* < 0.
25 The magnitude of industry demand shifts is suggested by the monthly variation in
capacity utilization between mid-1933 and mid-1939. Investigation of Concentration of Eco-
nomic Power: Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee (Select Com-
mittee), Iron and Steel Industry, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Parts 26-27, at 13858 (1940) (ab-
breviated hereafter as TNEC Hearings). In July 1933, the steel industry was operating at 55
percent of capacity, the highest rate since mid-1930. The utilization rate fell to 26 percent in
November 1933, rose to 59 percent in May 1934, fell to 22 percent in September 1934, and
rose to 50 percent by January 1935. During 1935, utilization rates fluctuated between 39
percent and 55 percent. Throughout 1936 and early 1937, the capacity utilization rate rose
fairly steadily to a peak of 91 percent in March 1937. The rate stayed above 70 percent
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conditions are the most favorable for identifying a supply relation gen-
erally and for identifying the influence of demand shocks on the industry
markup.
Second, steel sellers apparently interacted under uncertainty, in an
environment conducive to the cartel policing behavior embedded in the
econometric model. Firms in this industry most likely learned about mar-
ketplace behavior primarily through contacts with their customers and
suppliers.2 6 Because this information was limited, the steel producers may
well have been unable to distinguish between demand declines and rival
cheating if they were colluding.
The strongest evidence that steel producers in the Depression could not
monitor their rivals perfectly comes from the provisions of the iron and
steel industry's Code of Fair Competition, devised by the industry 27 and
through September 1937, then fell precipitously to 26 percent in December. The rate did not
climb above 40 percent until August 1938. It peaked at 61 percent in November 1938, then
stayed in a range between 49 percent and 57 percent through July 1939. Because industry
capacity was stable throughout these years, id., these large utilization fluctuations reflect
demand variation.
26 Although the weekly trade publication Iron Age attempted to monitor demand fluctua-
tions, the reported information was vague and impressionistic. The analysis of industry
trends attempted to control for business-cycle fluctuations and other demand or cost in-
fluences, but it is unlikely that these descriptive reports significantly increased the industry
demand information available to each firm from its interactions with customers and sup-
pliers.
For example, industry news stories in January and February 1936 focused primarily on
trends in steel production relative to orders from the automobile, rail, and heavy industry
sectors and on production and distribution problems associated with winter weather. The
stories suggested that higher steel demand was commensurate with exogenous increases in
industrial production.
On February 27, Iron Age first noted the conjunction of increasing production and
"weakening" prices that characterized its reports during March. The March 12 issue ob-
served that the decision of a leading producer to publish price lists for the second quarter
promised future "price stability." It also emphasized that deviations from the price list
could be considered antitrust violations. In the next issue, the publication interpreted an
increase in customer orders as reflecting buyer anticipation of price stabilization. By April,
news stories were describing the end of the episode of price weakness. According to the
April 9 issue, prices rose slightly. On April 16, price pressure was being "firmly resisted."
As described in the trade press, the events of March 1936 appeared to reflect some sort of
supply side phenomenon. While these reports were consistent with an episode of increased
competition (cartel policing) following a negative-demand shock, the demand shock was not
itself described. A demand shock was identified econometrically (see note 67 infra) and in
consequence likely would have been noted contemporaneously by industry members (al-
though not necessarily distinguished from rival cheating). Thus, in identifying the demand
shock, the Iron Age reports did not add to the information firms most likely possessed
already from their own marketplace contacts.
27 The code was devised through negotiations among the major producers and workers.
Workers were represented by officials from the Department of Labor because they were not
then unionized.
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promulgated by the National Recovery Administration (NRA). 28 The steel
code was in effect from August 1933 through May 1935.29 Given the
opportunity to cooperate legally,3 ° industry members chose neither to
require a common industrywide price schedule nor to insist upon some
prespecified division of output. 3 1 Rather, in a period in which any express
collusive arrangement would be enforceable by law, 32 the steel producers
chose merely to create a variety of mechanisms for prohibiting secret,
selective price cutting. Each seller was required to adhere to the list
prices it posted, but each could announce its own price schedule and
change prices unilaterally. The industry established a standardized set of
product definitions and standardized conduct provisions such as buyer
financing terms and the basing point pricing rules for computing shipping
costs. In addition, the industry designated as an unfair practice, punish-
able by law, the substitution of a higher quality product for the product
specified in a contract.
The third reason the steel industry during the Depression was chosen
for study is that the investigation of industrial concentration by the Tem-
28 See, generally, Carroll Daugherty, Melvin de Chazeau, & Samuel Stratton, The Eco-
nomics of the Iron and Steel Industry (vols. I and 2, 1937).
29 On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the act authorizing industry
pricing codes.
30 Other industries took advantage of the opportunity created by the NRA to engage in
much more explicit price fixing. Some codes provided for setting minimum prices, either as a
matter of course or when an "emergency" was declared by virtue of "destructive" pricing
in the marketplace. Leverett Lyon et al., The National Recovery Administration: An Analy-
sis and Appraisal 578-85, 603-10 (1935). Other codes prohibited sales below cost, typically
in combination with devising a standardized accounting system that defined "cost" as
incorporating most joint and common costs (including indirect manufacturing expenses,
administrative expenses, and selling expenses) in addition to direct labor and material costs.
Id. at 585-91. Minimum price setting was common among sellers of industrial equipment,
while below-cost sale prohibitions were common in the codes promulgated by manufactur-
ing industries and sellers of basic materials. Id at 580-83.
"' Although the steel code prohibited the erection of new production capacity, it excepted
two areas of ongoing technological progress: new electric furnaces and improvements in
steel finishing capacity.
32 The board of directors of the American Iron and Steel Institute, the industry trade
association, was empowered to enforce the code by gathering statistics, checking the books
of reporting companies, and assessing damages for violations. Firms that did not sign the
code were required to comply with its provisions, although it was more difficult to enforce
the code with respect to such sellers. While detailed monthly production and capacity data
was collected, no statistics were collected on cost variation or the geographic distribution of
shipments in order to avoid placing an information-gathering burden on producers.
Although the enforcement of many of the one thousand industry codes was problematic
(see, generally, Peter Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 35-57 (1982)), the steel code had a
strong compliance record because, uniquely among industry codes, all the major steel pro-
ducers agreed to subject themselves to a contractual enforcement mechanism involving the
payment of liquidated damages for violations. Donald Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of
Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration 214 (1988).
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porary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in 1940 led to the publica-
tion of statistical information in monthly time series. Monthly observa-
tions provide a plausible approximation to the lag in this industry between
firms observing unexpected price declines and their output response.
Monthly data also permit a large number of observations from periods of
stable industry structure. Finally, as will be described in detail in the
remainder of this section, the steel industry during the 1930s was chosen
for study because its structure could have been consistent with either
competition or collusion.
A. Structural Case for Collusion
Many observers have suggested that the U.S. steel industry engaged in
cooperative pricing during at least some portion of the 1920s and 1930s. 3 3
A variety of structural factors are consistent with this view.
Most important, the steel industry was concentrated. The four-firm
concentration ratio was around 60 percent during these decades, and the
eight-firm concentration ratio rose from two-thirds to more than three-
fourths. 3 4 In 1938, the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based
on production capacity was roughly 1620, 3 5 at the high end of the moder-
ately concentrated range defined by the current Department of Justice
merger guidelines. United States Steel, the largest firm, typically held a
market share in the 35-40 percent range during the 1930S3 6 and acted as
the industry's price leader.3 7
As a group, these firms were arguably free from competitive discipline.
Demand substitutes for steel were limited in most applications, 3 8 imports
were a minor concern, and the large sunk costs associated with the in-
troduction of new steelmaking capacity reduced the threat of entry. As a
result, industry demand was likely inelastic in the long run 39 and the
potential gains from collusion were substantial.
33 Morris Adelman, Steel, Administered Prices and Inflation, 75 Q. J. Econ. 16, 35 n.4
(1961); TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 14232; Leonard Weiss, Oligopoly-Steel, in Case
Studies in American Industry 158, 176-77, 191 (Leonard Weiss ed., 3d ed. 1980).
34 Walter Adams & Hans Muller, The Steel Industry, in The Structure of American
Industry 74, 80 (Walter Adams ed., 7th ed. 1986).
35 TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13903.
36 Id., at 13848, 13852.
37 Weiss, supra note 33, at 191.
38 In 1938, steel was typically used in the production of auto, rail, and farm equipment,
consumer durables, and cans, as well as in construction. TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at
13816.
39 A Depression-era statistical study prepared under the supervision of Theodore 0.
Yntema concluded that industry demand was highly inelastic, with an elasticity of 0.3 to 0.4.
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In addition, a number of industry practices appeared to facilitate collu-
sion. Although the industry moved from a single-basing-point pricing sys-
tem to multiple basing points in 1924, when the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) outlawed the former practice,4 ° this shift appeared to have
little practical effect on pricing. 4' Antitrust enforcers have traditionally
been hostile to basing point pricing on the view that it provides a focal
point for pricing coordination.42 Further, an industry trade group began
publishing freight-rate data around 1934, facilitating interfirm monitoring
of freight absorption for the remainder of the decade.43
Coordination of a steel cartel appears to have been feasible. The homo-
geneity of semifinished steel products likely aided firms in their efforts to
agree on a collusive price. Also, the industry's experience with express
collusion may have improved the prospects for subsequent tacit coordina-
tion.44 That experience included the infamous "Gary dinners" around
191045 and the industry's adherence to the steel code from mid-1933
through mid-1935.
B. Structural Case for Competition
On the other hand, a credible structural argument for competition could
be offered.4 6 In 1929, a sizeable disruptive competitor, National Steel,
TNEC Hearings, supra note 22, at 13913, 13927. However, Yntema did not correct for the
simultaneity of demand with supply. A modern study estimates the elasticity at 0.6 or 0.7,
also inelastic. Robert Rogers, The Behavior of Firms in an Oligopoly Industry: A Study of
Conjectural Variations 151 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington Univ., May
1983).
4o The Basing Point Problem, xi (Monograph No. 42, Temporary National Economic
Committee, 1941). Multiple basing points were not forbidden until 1948.
41 Kenneth Warren, The American Steel Industry 1850-1970: A Geographical Intepreta-
tion 203-04 (1973); Kenneth Mayall, International Cartels: Economic and Political Aspects
67-68 (1952).
42 Richard Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 70-71 (1976); F. Michael
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 329 (2d ed. 1980).
43 TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 14177-78, 14222-23.
44 The U.S. industry also had experience with cooperation in sales abroad. The dozen
leading U.S. steel producers organized a Webb-Pomerene Export Association in 1928. The
Steel Export Association of America participated actively in international steel commodity
cartels from July 1928 through September 1939, and especially beginning in December 1937.
These international agreements were suspended by the outbreak of World War II. They
expressly excluded the domestic market of the United States. See, generally, Federal Trade
Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on International Steel Cartels, 3-4,
11-12 (1948); Ervin Hexner, International Cartels 203-15 (1945).
45 Weiss, supra note 33, at 171-72.
46 The performance evidence from accounting profits is consistent with the view that the
industry was competitive during this period. Steel profits were generally lower than the
manufacturing sector average during the 1920s and 1930s and the two profit streams were
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was created by merger.47 In addition, firms other than the market leaders
aggressively adopted new low cost production technologies.48 These de-
velopments should have increased the difficulty for interfirm cooper-
ation.4 9
Industry capacity utilization was low during the Depression when the
durable-goods demand from which steel demand is derived declined pre-
cipitously. The industry virtually shut down in December 1932, when the
utilization rate fell below 15 percent. The rate stayed below 15 percent in
December 1932 and remained below 50 percent from late 1930 to mid-1935
and again from late 1937 through late 1938.50 Excess capacity implies that
marginal costs were low for steel producers, increasing their incentive to
compete.5l
highly correlated. Weiss, supra note 33, at 224. However, accounting profits are frequently
poor indicators of economic profits because of the accounting treatment of fixed costs.
Franklin Fisher & John McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer
Monopoly Profits, 73 Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1983). Further, it is often difficult to distinguish
profits from rents to low cost factors of production (perhaps plant location in the steel
industry) or superior product design.
The accounting evidence on markups, in contrast, suggests less competitive behavior.
The Lerner Index for U.S. Steel implied by firm aggregate revenue and marginal cost data
developed for the TNEC hearings rose from 0.2 in 1929-31 to 0.3 in 1937 and 0.4 in 1938.
TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13789-91 (total revenues), 14039 (quantity in weighted
tons), 14049 (marginal cost).
47 Weiss, supra note 33, at 178, 193-94.
48 Adams & Mueller, supra note 34, at 78-79; Weiss, supra note 33. at 191-92; Rogers,
supra note 39, at 82, 84.
49 Further, industry negotiations to create the steel code revealed a divergence of interest
between large and small sellers. These differences may have made tacit coordination among
those sellers more difficult during years outside the code period. However, intraindustry
differences of opinion were significantly more muted in steel than in most industries. Brand,
supra note 32, at 211.
5o TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13858.
S" Some transaction price evidence at first appears consistent with secret price cutting by
steel producers during recessions. An index of U.S. Steel's net mill price, which takes into
account freight absorption, fell up to 4 percent below a composite price index excluding
freight absorption during 1931-33, the first trough of the Depression. A similar discrepancy
appeared in 1937-38, the second trough. The maximum discrepancy briefly exceeded 10
percent in 1937. TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13810-11. Further, this variation was
apparently not a consequence of changes in the product mix associated with the business
cycle, as the same pattern was apparent in the pricing of heavy structural shapes. Id. at
13796. These price-series differences probably did not reflect secret price cutting through
freight absorption, however, because the discrepancy was much higher in the earlier periods
of 1912-13, 1916-18, and 1922-23-largely boom years-than during these Depression
dates. Id. at 13815.
The observed pattern of differences between these price series may instead result from a
difference in the quantities measured. Net mill yield includes additional revenues for special
finish, quality, size, or heat treatment, while the composite price index is an index of base
prices. Id. at 13811. The observed pricing pattern could have been caused by shifts in the
demand for these extras relative to the demand for steel generally, uncorrelated with the
business cycle.
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Moreover, the argument for competition contests whether interfirm
coordination is feasible by pointing to the extensive differentiation of
.finished steel products. While base prices apply to a handful of standard
sizes and qualities, "producers must be prepared to quote modified base
prices on thousands of possible variations." 52 If the high degree of captive
production makes it impossible for firms to monitor semifinished steel
prices, colluding firms would find it necessary to coordinate finished
steel prices, a far more difficult task than coordinating the prices of
semifinished products.53
Finally, multiple basing point pricing need not have been a practice
facilitating collusion; it may have been consistent with competition. 54 The
support of some steel buyers for basing point pricing gives added plausi-
bility to the view that this practice reflects competition rather than coop-
eration; 55 consumers of steel are unlikely to favor a practice that facili-
tates collusion among sellers.
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section presents estimates of the demand function and supply
relation for the U.S. steel industry during the 1935-39 period in order to
test the hypothesis that negative-demand shocks alter industry behavior.
The results support the view that unexpected declines in demand cause a
temporary change in oligopoly behavior in the direction of increased com-
petition, and thus support the inference that steel firms were colluding
under conditions of uncertainty. In contrast, negative-demand shocks had
no effect on the oligopoly markup during the 1933-35 period when the
NRA steel code was in force, consistent with the view that marketplace
punishments were unnecessary when interfirm cooperation was legally
enforceable.
52 Competition and Monopoly in American Industry 133 (Monograph No. 21, Temporary
National Economic Committee, 1940).
13 Consistent with this suggestion, the international steel cartel of the interwar period
originally attempted to control semifinished steel prices and outputs but shifted its efforts in
1930 to control finished steel products. The 1933 agreement devised output quotas for both
finished and semifinished products. Hexner, supra note 44, at 203-12.
" TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 14619; David Haddock, Basing Point Pricing: Com-
petitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 289 (1982). If buyers are geographically
dispersed, if some spatial locations have production cost advantages, and if there are a large
number of sellers at each such location, then in equilibrium the market price at any con-
sumption location will be the delivered price of a marginal producer from a nearby advanta-
geous production location. These competitive prices would mimic a basing point system.
" TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 14430. However, the large automobile manufactur-
ers opposed the steel basing point system. Brand, supra note 32, at 220.
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A. Variables and Sample Periods
A glossary of variable names is provided in Appendix A. The price and
quantity of semifinished steel were selected for analysis in preference to
the comparable data for finished steel because semifinished products are
close supply substitutes and therefore can be considered homogeneous
goods. Finished steel products are, in contrast, arguably neither substi-
tutes in demand nor substitutes in supply.
Variables reflecting exogenous shifts in demand and supply were lim-
ited by the availability of monthly time-series data for the 1930s. 56 The
demand for steel is a derived demand, primarily dependent during that
period upon the output of the automobile, rail, and construction sectors of
the economy. These sectors produce durable goods, so their demand is
heavily influenced by the business cycle. To capture these influences, the
regressions include the current level of industrial production and mea-
sures of its change over the previous three, twelve, and twenty-four
month periods. 57 To capture the effect of shifts in business-cycle leader-
ship across the auto, rail, and construction sectors, which may use steel in
different intensities, quantity variables for the output of the auto and rail
car production industries were introduced. Finally, the price of alumi-
num, which is likely both a demand substitute and a demand complement
for steel, 58 was included in the regressions as a demand-shift variable.
Two supply-shift variables were employed: the price of pig iron and the
hourly wage rate for steel industry workers. 59 The price of scrap steel was
not included in the reported regressions. The scrap price is unlikely to
affect steel demand, 60 and its possible role as a supply shift variable is
treated in the discussion of specification tests. Capacity utilization rates
were not included in the regression equations as variables affecting mar-
ginal cost, for two reasons. First, utilization variation over the sample
56 The present study of steel demand incorporates exogenous variables roughly repre-
senting those suggested by Theodore 0. Yntema in 1939. TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at
13921-22.
57 These business-cycle variables can be thought of as standing for firm expectations
about future demand. The econometric results presented below were robust to an alternative
approach to accounting for the intertemporal nature of demand. See note 75 infra and
accompanying text.
58 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Competition Between Steel and Alumi-
num (prepared by the Industry Division, Economic Commission for Europe, Steel Commit-
tee, 1954).
'9 Unlike the other variables, the wage series was not available before 1934.
60 Scrap steel is not a substitute for semifinished or finished steel in most industrial uses.
Further, the scrap sector was unimportant empirically in estimating aluminum demand over
a similar time period. Valerie Suslow, Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive
Recycling: An Application to Alcoa, 17 Rand J. Econ. 389 (1986).
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period appears to have been caused almost entirely by business-cycle
fluctuation already captured by the industrial production variables, not
by the introduction of new capacity with concomitant effect on marginal
cost. Second, because output already appears in the supply function, a
utilization variable would have the role of capturing the increasing slope
of marginal cost when industry production approached capacity. This
problem did not arise during the Great Depression. Between 1927 and
1939, capacity utilization rates never exceeded 92 percent other than
during a six-month period in 1929.61
The focus of these regressions is on identifying demand shocks and the
output response to them, rather than on estimating the elasticities of the
exogenous variables in the demand and supply functions. In conse-
quence, simple time-series predictive mechanisms were incorporated into
the equations. A time variable was included in both the supply curve and
the demand curve to capture long-term trends in demand, marginal cost,
or oligopoly behavior. Further, seasonality in demand6 2 was accounted
for by two dummy variables: one for the spring peak months of Feb-
ruary and March and one for the winter trough months of November
and December. These variables were treated as exogenous sources of de-
mand shifts. Many of the equations were estimated with adjustments for
first-order serial correlation of the errors. All variables were measured
monthly in order to approximate the length of the detection-and-response
lag for firms observing the possibility of rival defection.63
61 TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13858.
62 See Id.
63 If the lag were actually shorter than one month, then price may have returned to the
cooperative level before each observation period ended. Average monthly prices would then
understate the price reduction that results from cartel policing following a demand shock,
and the coefficient on DUM would be biased toward zero. Nevertheless, some decline most
likely would be detectable econometrically.
If the lag were longer than one month, the estimate of the coefficient of DUM would not be
affected in a large sample. The dummy variable in effect removes from the sample output
observations that arise simultaneously with a negative price shock. If firms respond to the
threat of rival cheating by increasing output for more than one month, then the sample will
contain some high output observations reflecting cartel policing behavior not removed by
the dummy variable. These observations can be thought of as negative realizations of v, the
supply-shock variable, uncorrelated with any other variable in the supply curve. The con-
stant term in the estimated supply relation will be biased because the presence of such
observations implies that v has a negative mean. But all other coefficients, including the
coefficient of the dummy variable, will continue to be estimated consistently for reasons
similar to those discussed at note 13 supra.
If price wars typically last more than one month, their average length can be inferred by
adding to the regression function dummy variables lagged one or more periods from the date
of the negative-demand shock. Additional lags would be introduced so long as they enter




Demand from Supply from Supply from
August 1935 to September 1935 September 1933
Function July 1939* to July 1939* to June 1935*
C -1.00 (1.3) -. 06 (.7) -. 60 (3.0)
LQ -. 08 (1.3) -. 02 (1.3) .04 (5.0)
TIME .01 (15.5) .01 (4.3) .00 (.5)
LRIRP ... .37 (4.9) 1.70 (12.4)
LRWAGE ... -. 05 (.5)
DUM ... -. 01 (3.2) .00 (.3)
LRALP -. 49 (2.6) .....
SP -. 00 (.1) ....
WN -. 00 (.7) ....
LCAR .02 (2.9) ....
LRAIL -. 01 (1.6) ....
LRY .07 (.4) ....
LRDY3 .02 (.3) ....
LRDY12 -. 17 (3.8) ....
LRDY24 .13 (2.5) ..
RHO .26 (1.6) .92 (17.3)
T ... .48 .50
Statistics:
R 2  .96 .95 .95
Durbin-Watson 1.90 1.88 1.76
N 48 47 22
NorE.-t-statistics are given in parentheses.
* LRP is the dependent variable in each equation.
The empirical study primarily concerns the monthly observations from
July 1935 to July 1939. This sample period commences at the end of the
NRA-code period and lasts until monthly data were no longer available
from the TNEC hearings. For comparison, the empirical methodology is
also applied to observations from August 1933 to June 1935, the period in
which the steel code was in force. Collusion was presumably a dominant
strategy for all producers under the NRA, so a cartel policing response to
unexpected demand declines should not be detected.
B. Estimation Results
Results for the 1935-39 sample period are presented in the first two
columns of Table 1. The first column exhibits the preferred specification
coefficient of zero. When the loss ofa few degrees of freedom is unimportant, this procedure
would also reduce the standard error of estimate in the supply relation regression if price
wars last longer than one period. The application of this procedure is discussed at note 69
infra.
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of the demand curve. To identify the demand curve, the exogenous cost-
shift variables were instrumented for output. 64 The equation was esti-
mated with a procedure correcting for first-order serial correlation in the
errors, resulting in the loss of an observation from the sample.
The estimated own-price elasticity of demand is high; an elasticity of
- 12 is implied by the point estimate of the inverse elasticity. While
empirical studies involving yearly observations have concluded that the
demand for steel was inelastic,6 5 demand was likely far more elastic with
respect to monthly fluctuations in price or output because buyers could
build or draw down inventories inexpensively for short periods. In conse-
quence, an elastic short-run demand curve does not imply the absence of
large gains to cooperative behavior.
Although the seasonal dummy variables and some of the industrial
production and sectoral demand shift variables are insignificant, all were
included in the preferred specification because they were suggested by
theory and correlated with industry output. The residuals from the esti-
mated demand function were used to construct the dummy variable DUM
employed in estimating the supply function. The likelihood function was
maximized by triggering the dummy variable when demand fell randomly
by more than 0.48 times the standard error of estimate. 66 This occurred in
twelve of the forty-eight periods covered by the 1935-39 sample.67
The second column of Table 1 shows the preferred specification of the
supply relation. In estimating this equation, excluded exogenous demand-
shift variables were used as instruments for quantity and a correction for
first-order serial correlation was employed. The estimated supply func-
tion is essentially horizontal, likely reflecting excess production capacity
in the industry. 68 The price of iron, the most important physical input,
enters significantly and positively. It is surprising that wages have no
effect on marginal cost, although the estimated standard error implies that
' Single equation estimation methods were employed. It is difficult to estimate the sys-
tem of demand and supply functions simultaneously because the errors in the demand curve
are used to create the variable DUM employed in estimating the supply relation.
65 See note 39 supra.
6 An unexpected demand decline reducing price by 8 percent lowered the estimated
demand function by one standard error of estimate. Hence, with T approximately equal to
one half, DUM was triggered by unexpected declines in price of 4 percent or more.
67 For the 1935-39 regressions reported in Table I, large negative-demand shocks caused
DUM to take on the value of one in the following periods: October 1935, March 1936, June
1936, August 1936, November 1936, December 1936, February 1937, June 1937, July 1937,
July 1938, May 1939, and July 1939.
68 In the log-linear functional form of eq. (12), parameters associated with the markup
shift the constant term rather than the slope of the supply relation. Hence, the slope parame-
ter of the supply relation is interpreted as reflecting the slope of marginal cost.
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the coefficient on the wage variable could be consistent with a substantial
positive elasticity.
The hypothesis that unexpected declines in demand lead to more com-
petitive behavior is tested by the coefficient on the dummy variable. This
coefficient is negative and significant, consistent with the existence of
cartel policing under uncertainty. Thus, this equation supports the hy-
pothesis that steel producers were colluding during the late 1930s.
While the coefficient on the dummy variable is significant, its mag-
nitude is small. The low point estimate is not troublesome for two rea-
sons. First, as indicated in equation (12), -y* must be inferred by dividing
the coefficient of the dummy variable by the inverse-demand elasticity.
Because the point estimate of the demand elasticity is small and imper-
fectly estimated, a wide range of values of -y*, including very large values,
is consistent with the coefficient reported in Table 1. Second, even if -y* is
small, collusion in the steel industry may be supportable by shallow epi-
sodes of increased competition, particularly if information lags are brief.
69
The model was also estimated over the period when the NRA steel code
was in effect, from mid-1933 to mid-1935. To identify the demand shocks
arising during the small NRA sample, the demand curve was assumed to
be a stable function from mid-1933 through mid-1939.70 In contrast, the
69 In order to achieve the best high-price equilibrium in a trigger-price model, reversion to
the worst low price equilibrium is generally required. However, some other collusive price is
typically supportable by reversion to a low price equilibrium that is not the worst possible.
See, generally, Shapiro, supra note 11, at 53-58. Moreover, reducing the lag with which
firms receive information about their rivals' actions typically increases the efficacy of collu-
sion. Id. at 55-56.
The data permits an estimate of the joint detection and response lag. When a dummy
variable lagged one month was introduced into the supply relation (see note 63 supra), it had
a positive coefficient insignificant from zero, while the coefficient on DUM remained sig-
nificant and negative. In consequence, the detection lag and response lag individually are
each likely no longer than one month. (The theoretical significance of a short response lag is
unclear. Frequent moves in a repeated game setting may make collusion more effective-by
increasing punishments-or less effective-by increasing the scope of detection. Shapiro,
supra note 11, at 55-56.)
70 When the demand function was estimated over the 1933-39 period, the slope
coefficient was estimated as a small positive number. This troubling result, suggesting the
possibility of specification error, would normally call into question whether the dummy
variable identifies periods of large negative-demand shocks. In this particular case, how-
ever, the identification of the shocks is fairly trustworthy because the residuals for the 1935-
39 period generated by the demand curve estimated from 1933-39 and the resulting dummy
variable are similar to the residuals and dummy variable generated by the demand function
limited to the 1935-39 sample.
Attempts to estimate the model over two earlier sample periods, January 1927 to May
1930, and June 1930 to July 1933, were also beset by the difficulty of estimating a downward
sloping demand function. The econometric problem in all these cases appears to be that
demand shocks are large relative to observable shifts in supply. In a small sample, the noise
from random demand variation can readily lead to estimates with the wrong slope.
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estimated supply relation was limited to the brief sample period in which
the steel code was in force to allow the parameters of the marginal cost
function and the average markup to vary from their values in the later
period.71
The estimated supply function of the steel code sample period, shown
in the third column of Table 1, exhibits sensible coefficient estimates
other than the high reported elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the
price of iron, which may reflect specification bias associated with the
omission of other cost-shift variables. The coefficient on the dummy vari-
able was estimated as a small positive number, indistinguishable from
zero. This result is consistent with the view that the steel code made
collusion a dominant strategy for all sellers, so industry members never
interpreted price declines as rival cheating and never increased output in
response.7 2
C. Specification Tests
Several specification tests were employed to confirm the cartel polic-
ing response to unexpected demand declines observed in the estimated
supply function for the 1935-39 sample period. Two tests investigated
whether the model is robust to alternative functional forms. The first
estimated a linear version of the structural model. 73 The supply relation
for this model confirmed the log-linear results: periods of negative-
demand shocks led to significant reductions in markup.74 The second test
addressed the possibility that the dummy variable was picking up a curva-
ture of the structural supply curve not already controlled for by the log-
linear functional form. To confirm that a negative coefficient on DUM
reflected a response to unexpected demand declines rather than the effect
of large residuals of either sign, a new variable was introduced into the
supply relation equal to the square of the residual of the demand function.
Although the new variable entered significantly, the coefficient on the
dummy variable remained negative and significant, and its point estimate
7' The supply relation regressions for the NRA sample period also differ from the regres-
sions for the 1935-39 period because the wage rate was omitted as an exogenous variable.
See note 59 supra.
72 The statistical results showing an absence of cartel policing are also consistent with the
implausible alternative hypothesis that the industry equilibrium was a noncooperative one
while the steel code was in effect.
73 When demand and marginal cost are linear, the oligopoly markup affects the slope of
the supply relation rather than the intercept. Hence, the dummy variable enters into the
linear supply function interacted with output.
7' These estimates were less satisfactory than those obtained from the log-linear model
because the residual plots suggested that the linear equation was misspecified.
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doubled in magnitude. Hence, this robustness test also confirms the re-
sults obtained from the log-linear specification.
Another specification test involved an alternative treatment of the busi-
ness cycle in the demand function. Instead of capturing intertemporal
demand shifts through lagged industrial production variables, this test
employed industrial production measured one year in the future as a
proxy for current expectations. 75 As before, the residuals from the de-
mand equation were used to create a dummy variable employed in es-
timating the supply relation. The resulting supply-function estimates were
similar to those reported in Table 1, and the coefficient on the dummy
variable remained negative and significant.
One robustness test explored the significance of the omission of the
price of scrap steel from the supply function. Scrap is the largest physical
input into semifinished steel production after pig iron,7 6 so its factor price
would likely affect marginal cost. However, the greater part of the scrap
employed in producing semifinished steel comes directly from the produc-
tion of semifinished steel rather than from the spot market; the two goods
are to a large extent complements in supply. 77 In consequence, the equi-
librium price of scrap steel is determined simultaneously with the equilib-
rium price and output of semifinished steel.
The price of scrap steel was omitted from the reported supply-function
regressions because no instruments were available to correct for its simul-
taneity with output. This omission could bias the coefficient of the dummy
variable in the direction of a large negative number-leading an observer
to mistakenly identify cartel policing-if lower scrap prices both reduce
demand (creating the appearance of a random demand decline) and in-
crease supply (by lowering marginal costs). To confirm that scrap prices
did not have this effect on the estimated regression equation, the scrap
price was included in the supply function (without an instrument). The
coefficient of DUM did not change markedly and the regression as a
whole deviated little from the equation reported in Table 1.78 Hence, it is
unlikely that omitting the exogenous component of the scrap-price vari-
able created the mistaken appearance of cartel policing.
75 Ek p6st realIzations measure ex ante expectations with random forecast error. Lagged
indiistrial fb'ddiketidhi was employed as an instrument to correct for this errors-in-variables
problem.
76 TNEC Hearings; supra note 25, at 10392.
77 Id.: L o i ei al., supra note 30, at 333, 364.
78 The log deflated scrap price entered positively in the 1935-39 equation with a
coefficient of 0.04 and a t-statistic of 1. 1. The dummy variable coefficient rose in absolute
value to - 0.02, and its t-statistic was 3.0. When the price of scrap steel was included in the
supply function regression for the NRA period, the results were also similar to those re-
ported in Table 1.
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Two robustness tests were suggested by problems associated with the
use of semifinished steel prices as the dependent variable. 79 First, the
reported price of semifinished steel may not be a market price because
most industry production of semifinished steel (90 percent in 1929) was
transferred captively within integrated producers.8 ° In particular, some
industry participants during the 1930s believed that integrated firms seek-
ing to deter unintegrated producers of semifinished steel from entering
into finished steel production kept the semifinished price artificially
high. 8' Under this story, colluding downstream producers in effect shared
their cartel profits with the unintegrated upstream sector, in exchange for
the unintegrated semifinished sector's forbearance from new entry down-
stream. 82
To show that semifinished prices in fact represent the market price of
semifinished products, the demand and supply functions for semifinished
steel were reestimated over the 1935-39 sample period while substituting
a finished steel transaction price series for the semifinished price series.83
For the purpose of interpreting this regression, the finished price series
can be thought of as a noisy proxy for the unobservable semifinished
price, with a mean value in excess of the mean semifinished price by the
average costs of conversion. In the estimated supply relation, all variables
had an appropriate sign. The coefficient on the dummy variable did not
change significantly from the previously reported supply function, al-
79 In addition to the two problems discussed in the text, reported semifinished steel prices
may not reflect true transactions prices. George Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand
Curve and Rigid Prices, 55 J. Pol. Econ. 432 (1947). For example, selective seller discount-
ing or freight absorption may have lowered transaction prices, or unanticipated buyer short-
ages may have raised prices. Even if this hypothesis is correct, however, the reported prices
appear to be unbiased proxies for the true prices for two reasons. First, the evidence from
finished steel products shows that reported prices generally moved in tandem with U.S.
Steel's composite mill net yield, a transactions price series, throughout the 1935 to 1939
sample period. The lone exception was a rapid increase in the reported price in early 1937
not reflected in the transaction price. TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 13815. Second, one
robustness test reported in the text, in which the finished steel transactions price is em-
ployed as a proxy for the semifinished price, can be interpreted as showing that this potential
difficulty did not affect the regression results.
80 Daugherty, de Chazeau, & Stratton, supra note 28, at 21.
81 Id., at 580, 601-10.
82 In addition to the econometric evidence discussed in the text, the theory founders on
the evidence that the spread between the prices of various finished steel products and the
semifinished product from which they were made widened under the NRA steel code.
Daugherty, de Chazeau, & Stratton, supra note 28, at 601. The entry deterrence theory has
trouble explaining this observation because there is no reason to believe that the threat of
vertical integration by semifinished producers was reduced by the provisions of the Code.
83 The finished transaction price series employed measured the mill-net yields for steel
products shipped domestically by U.S. Steel subsidiaries. TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at
14103.
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though its standard error grew in consequence of the added noise. The
coefficient on the dummy variable remained significant at a 10 percent
level.
Second, the semifinished price series exhibits apparent nominal rigidi-
ties, especially during the NRA period.84 This observation suggests the
possibility that larger than expected price declines associated with large
negative-demand shocks reflect "menu costs" prohibiting price adjust-
ment when demand shocks are small, rather than cartel policing. To eval-
uate this theory, the supply model for the 1935-39 sample period was
fitted to a subsample of observations consisting of those periods in which
a nominal price change occurred.85 Despite the loss of degrees of free-
dom, the results remained robust to this alternative specification; the
coefficient of the dummy variable remained negative and significant.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE 1930s
The empirical evidence presented in this article suggests that during
some or all of the period from July 1935 through July 1939, the U.S. steel
producers were supporting cooperation with marketplace punishments as
predicted by the trigger-price models. In contrast, no marketplace punish-
ments were detected for the NRA period. The latter finding suggests that
the steel code successfully facilitated collusion by ensuring that coopera-
tion was a dominant strategy for all producers.
Perhaps the most interesting interpretation of these results is contingent
upon the assumption that competition was a dominant strategy for steel
manufacturers in 1933.86 Then the NRA steel code provides a structural
84 Daugherty, de Chazeau, & Stratton, supra note 30, at 1107.
85 The number of observations fell dramatically. To conserve degrees of freedom, only
one exogenous cost-shift variable, the price of iron, was employed. Because the method of
sample construction led to a large number of missing observations, the possibility of auto-
correlated disturbances was taken into account by including a lagged dependent variable in
the regression, thereby altering the implicit assumption about the time series process fol-
lowed by the errors.
86 Although the structural evidence could be consistent with either competitive or co-
operative behavior during the early 1930s, this assumption implicitly weights heavily the
competitive pressure created by the massive levels of industry excess capacity during the
Depression. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra; Brand, supra note 32, at 211.
The view that cooperation replaced competition as a dominant strategy when the NRA
steel code was in effect, and that the industry cooperated under uncertainty after the NRA
was abolished, is consistent with recent macroeconomic estimates showing that the
NRA industry codes in aggregate increased the economy-wide price level by 14 percent per
year, while nullification of the codes decreased prices at only half that rate, 7 percent per
year. Michael Weinstein, Some Macroeconomic Impacts of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, 1933-1935, in The Great Depression 262, 267 (Karl Brunner ed. 1981).
Moreover, a recent study of conjectural variations in the steel industry is consistent with
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explanation for the industry's shift to cooperation in 1935. The experience
with collusion, the existence of a model for future cooperation in the form
of steel code provisions, and the publication of freight-rate data beginning
during the code period likely reduced the costs of future interfirm cooper-
ation. Hence, as was recognized contemporaneously by the Federal
Trade Commission, the NRA code provisions effectively continued in
force after the code was abolished.87 Only the enforcement mechanism
changed, from legal coercion to marketplace punishments. In sum, under
this interpretation of the empirical results, the NRA taught the steel pro-
ducers how to collude.8 8
the view that firm behavior was more competitive from 1931-33 than it was from 1935-39.
Rogers, supra note 39, at 219-33. Average conjectures-each firm's view of the average
output response of its rivals to its own output change-rose from the earlier period to the
later one for all but one of the eight leading firms in the industry, and the average conjecture
for the lone exception remained unchanged. (Because trigger-price models imply that firms
sometimes act cooperatively and other times act more competitively, average conjectures
should increase if cooperation under uncertainty replaces competition.)
87 TNEC Hearings, supra note 25, at 14232. Two anecdotes support this view. First, less
than ten days following the Supreme Court's decision holding the NRA unconstitutional, the
iron and steel industry's trade association membership unanimously adopted a resolution
declaring the "voluntary" intention of individual members to continue to abide by the
provisions of the steel code. Id. at 14434-35. Second, a schedule of industrywide adjust-
ments to base prices for nonstandard variations in steel products was arrived at coopera-
tively through discussions among competitors for years following the official end of the
NRA. Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, supra note 52, at 133.
88 By the standards of the mid-1930s, this result would have been counted a policy
success. One goal of the NRA was to stop price deflation through fostering interfirm cooper-
ation. By the time of the TNEC hearings, in contrast, the output and employment reduction
harms associated with collusion were considered to outweigh any price stability benefits.
Kenneth Roose, The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-38, at
142-43 (1954). Today collusion is considered harmful because supracompetitive pricing








P Wholesale price of semifinished steel billets
C Constant
Q Aggregate production of semifinished steel
TIME Months since start of sample
IRP Composite pig iron prices
WAGE Hourly earnings of workers in U.S. Steel's manufacturing subsidiaries
DUM Dummy variable taking on the value of one when the residual from the es-
timated demand curve is smaller than - T times the standard error of es-
timate of the demand equation (see eq. [13])
ALP Aluminum prices
SP Dummy variable for February and March
WN Dummy variable for November and December
CAR U.S. production of passenger cars
RAIL Quantity of rail freight cars shipped
Y Industrial production index
DYn Change in Y over the past n months (n = 3, 12, 24)
RHO First-order autocorrelation of the residuals
T Minimal size of negative-demand shocks triggering DUM as a fraction of
the standard error of estimate of the demand equation (see eq. [13])
WPI Wholesale price index
Prefixes:
L Logged values
R Dollar values expressed in real terms (divided by WPI)
SOURCES.-Data on the wholesale price of semifinished steel billets, the wholesale price index, compos-
ite pig iron prices, the quantity of rail freight cars shipped, U.S. production of passenger cars, and the
industrial production index were taken from Survey of Current Business (1933-39). Aluminum prices
were found in Metal Statistics (1942). Scrap steel prices were reported by Iron Age (July 1933-September
1939). Semifinished steel production data and the hourly earnings of workers in U.S. Steel's manufactur-
ing subsidiaries were taken from exhibits submitted during the Temporary National Economic Committee
Hearings (1940).
NOTE.-Other abbreviations include DRES, the vector of residuals from the estimated demand curve;
R
2
, the multiple correlation coefficient; and N, or the number of observations.
APPENDIX B
COMPARATIVE STATICS OF INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
The comparative statics of equations (I) and (4) with respect to demand and
supply shocks are presented in matrix equation (B1). These equations can be
solved to confirm the intuition of Figure i, that a demand shift traces out a more
steeply sloping function when demand declines unexpectedly than when demand
rises unexpectedly because the markup parameter varies with negative-demand
shocks but not with positive shocks.
Equation (B 1) holds constant the exogenous variables Y and W. The notations 0,
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
and 0,, refer to the partial derivatives of 0 with respect to the demand and supply
shocks, and functions subscripted q are partial derivatives with respect to quan-
tity.
I 0(f, + Qfqq) - cq dQ 0j -Qfq) OJ -(Qfq) + 1 dv -f,  (BI)
A random demand shift traces out the slope of the supply curve if the markup
parameter does not vary.8 9 This result, derived from equation (BI), is presented in
equation (B2). For 0. = 0,
(dP/dE)/(dQ/dE) = Cq - O(fq + Qfqq). (B2)
The right-hand expression in (B2) is the partial derivative of the supply relation (4)
with respect to output, under the assumption that 0 is a constant. The slope of the
supply relation equals the slope of the marginal cost function plus the slope of the
markup function 0(P - MR).9°
If instead 0 varies with E, a shift in E traces out a more steeply sloped function
because the demand shock causes both demand and supply to shift. For 0. 5 0,
(dP/dE)/(dQ/dE) = {[Cq - 0(fq + Qfqq)] + fq2 0EQ}/{l + [QfqOjl. (B3)
If a cartel employs marketplace punishments to support periods of collusive pric-
ing, then negative-demand shocks will lead to a lower markup, so that 0, > 0.
Hence, the additional addend in the numerator of (B3) is positive, while the
additional addend in the denominator is negative. Assuming that [1 + QfqO0E is
greater than zero, it is evident that the derivative (dP/dE)/(dQ/dF) in (B3) is a larger
positive number than the corresponding derivative in (B2).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; and Stacchetti, Ennio. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria
with Imperfect Monitoring." Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 251-69.
Adams, Walter, and Mueller, Hans. "The Steel Industry." In The Structure of
American Industry. 7th ed. Edited by Walter Adams. New York: Macmillan,
1986.
Adelman, Morris. "Steel, Administered Prices and Inflation." Quarterly Journal
of Economics 75 (February 1961): 16-40.
Brand, Donald. Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National
Recovery Administration. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Bresnahan, Timothy. "The Oligopoly Solution Concept Is Identified." Econom-
ics Letters 10 (1982): 87-92.
89 Similarly, when a random cost-shift occurs, supply curve fluctuations will trace out a
demand curve. The following equation, derived from ( 1), shows that this conceptual exper-
iment results in a function with the same slope as demand: (dP/dv)/(dQ/dv) = fq.
90 In general, the supply relation can be expected to slope upward. The expression for the
slope of the markup function, - O(fq + Qfqq), is likely a positive number, although it could
be negative if demand is a convex function (iffqq >> 0). Even then the slope of the supply
relation will remain positive unless the markup term swamps the marginal cost term in eq.
(B2).
CARTEL POLICING
Bresnahan, Timothy. "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile
Industry: The 1955 Price War." Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (June 1987):
457-82.
Daugherty, Carroll; de Chazeau, Melvin; and Stratton, Samuel. The Economics of
the Iron and Steel Industry. Vols. 1 and 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.
Federal Trade Commission. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Interna-
tional Steel Cartels. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.
Fisher, Franklin, and McGowan, John. "On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits." American Economic Review 73 (March
1983): 82-87.
Forsund, Finn; Lovell, C. A. Knox; and Schmidt, Peter. "A Survey of Production
Functions and of Their Relationship to Efficiency Measurements." Journal of
Econometrics 13 (May 1980): 5-25.
Green, Edward, and Porter, Robert. "Non-cooperative Collusion under Imper-
fect Price Information." Econometrica 52 (January 1984): 87-100.
Haddock, David. "Basing Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Theories."
American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 289-306.
Hexner, Ervin. International Cartels. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1945.
Hogan, William. Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United
States. Vol. 3. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971.
Irons, Peter. The New Deal Lawyers. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1982.
Lyon, Leverett; Homan, Paul; Terborgh, George; Lorwin, Lewis; Dearing,
Charles; and Marshall, Leonard. The National Recovery Administration: An
Analysis and Appraisal. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1935.
Mayall, Kenneth. International Cartels: Economic and Political Aspects. Rut-
land, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle, 1952.
Osborne, Dale, "Cartel Problems." American Economic Review 66 (December
1976): 835-44.
Porter, Robert. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee,
1880-1886." Bell Journal of Economics 14 (Autumn 1983): 301-14.
Porter, Robert. "On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars." Journal of
Industrial Economics 33 (June 1985): 415-26.
Posner, Richard. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1976.
Rogers, Robert. "The Behavior of Firms in an Oligopoly Industry: A Study of
Conjectural Variations." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington
University, May 1983.
Roose, Kenneth. The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of
1937-38. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954.
Salop, Steven. "Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination." In
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. Edited by Joseph
Stiglitz and G. Frank Mathewson. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986.
Scherer, F. M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 2d ed.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980.
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Shapiro, Carl. "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior." Discussion Paper No. 126.
Discussion Papers in Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University, 1987.
Slade, Margaret. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of
Tacit Collusion." Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (June 1987): 499-561.
Spence, Michael. "Efficient Collusion and Reaction Functions." Canadian Jour-
nal of Economics 11 (August 1978): 527-33.
Stigler, George. "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices." Journal
of Political Economy 55 (October 1947): 432-49.
Stigler, George. "A Theory of Oligopoly." Journal of Political Economy 55 (Feb-
ruary 1964): 44-61.
Suslow, Valerie. "Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling:
An Application to Alcoa." Rand Journal of Economics 17 (Autumn 1986): 389-
403.
Suslow, Valerie. "Stability in International Cartels: An Empirical Survey."
Working Paper E-88-7. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford Univer-
sity, 1988.
Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC). Investigation of Concentra-
tion of Economic Power. Hearings on the Iron and Steel Industry (Select Com-
mittee), Parts 26-27. 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1940.
Temporary National Economic Committee. "Competition and Monopoly in
American Industry." Monograph No. 21. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1940.
Temporary National Economic Committee. "The Basing Point Problem." Mono-
graph No. 42. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941.
United Nations. Competition between Steel and Aluminum. Economic and Social
Council, Industry Division, Economic Commission for Europe, Steel Commit-
tee, Geneva 1954.
Warren, Kenneth. The American Steel Industry 1850-1970: A Geographical In-
terpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
Weinstein, Michael. "Some Macroeconomic Impacts of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, 1933-1935." In The Great Depression Revisited. Edited by Karl
Brunner. Boston: Martinus Nijoff, 1981.
Weiss, Leonard. "Oligopoly-Steel." In Case Studies in American Industry. 3d
ed. New York: Wiley, 1980.
